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G L O B A L A D M I N I S T R A T I V E L A W
The question of how the globe should be governed depends, crucially, on one's diagnosis of its challenges. The S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance builds on two insights that have now become commonplaces. The first is that the liberal order constructed in large part by the United States after the Second World War is losing its claim to legitimacy. The second is that globalization has revealed governance gaps suggesting that the present order is in any case no longer effective. The first may be understood as a political challenge to the top-down hierarchy that dominates this order; the second as a bottom-up practical challenge to the relevance of existing institutions. Yet the viability of any system-wide prescriptive approach depends on political will that, historically, has been available only in times of crisis. It took the First World War to bring about the establishment of the League of Nations, and a Second to see the creation of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions. The only amendments to the UN Charter took place during the Organization's expansion in the wake of decolonization. It is possible that current crises -of climate change, public health, financial markets -will be sufficient to bring about similar tectonic shifts, but overcoming the underlying collective action problems requires a level of enlightened self-interest that is rare in international affairs, even if one assumes that political or institutional solutions to these crises exist.
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Other accounts therefore eschew major political or institutional change and focus on processes; often they are more descriptive than prescriptive, advocating a change in perspective rather than a wholesale change in political reality -evolution rather than revolution. Anne-Marie Slaughter, for example, has argued compellingly that government networks are an underutilized tool of global governance that operate in parallel to traditional institutions. 6 Advocacy of greater reliance on such networks can loosely be termed the deformalization of global processes and could lay the foundation for greater legitimacy in decision-making in so far as the various participating officials can be linked back to traditional domestic accountability structures. 7 The limitations of such an approach are that it remains subject to the power disparities of the political order and cannot easily overcome the collective action problems identified earlier. 8 An alternative (though not mutually exclusive) approach thus emphasizes instead the formalization of global processes. It is this account, largely descriptive of developments already occurring, that is the subject of the present paper. 
II. The Emergence of Global Administrative Law
The intentionally unexciting name given to this formalization of certain global processes is "global administrative law". 9 Blandness can be a virtue if it is equated with harmlessness, and indeed there is little to fear from global administrative law. The emerging set of rules to which it refers encompasses procedures and normative standards for regulatory decisionmaking that falls outside domestic legal structures and yet is not properly covered by public international law. The standards that are being imported into this new sphere of regulatory activity draw upon administrative law principles common in many jurisdictions, such as transparency, participation, and review. 10 As a response to the demand for accountability in globalization, then, this is distinct from demands that globalization be made more democratic; instead, these developments aim to make it more reasoned. 11 Nevertheless, though most of the discussion here is descriptive of existing phenomena, consolidation of this emerging body of norms would improve both the quality of decision-making and the ability of those affected by decisions to protect their legitimate rights and interests. widely, but there is rarely a general right for affected parties to challenge a decision;
frequently it is not possible even to seek reasons as to why a particular decision was made.
The disparate regimes may overlap -sometimes quite intentionally, as the market comes to be regulated by a market of regulation. In some areas, competing standards may be adopted on a "voluntary" basis, though the global marketplace quickly leads to standards becoming mandatory as a commercial reality if not a legal requirement. 
III. Accountability Deficits
Is it possible, then, to have meaningful accountability in this area? (This is separate from the question of whether accountability is always desirable -a point that is considered below.)
There are many ways of holding power to account. Mechanisms are available at the global level, but they tend to be responsive in nature and ad hoc in structure. Accountability should not simply be a reaction to scandal, however. To be effective it should normally exist as of right, which requires the creation of institutions, the elaboration of standards, and the potential for sanctions.
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This is not, of course, the only way to constrain power. Other means include negotiation constraints, checks and balances, the threat of unilateral action, and so on. Such constraints fall outside "accountability" as it is used here, but point to an important distinction between legal and political accountability. Legal accountability typically requires that a decision-maker has a convincing reason for a decision or act. Compliance with a rule will normally be a sufficient reason, though some administrative agencies may be established with a requirement to provide substantive reasons on the merits of a particular decision.
Political accountability, by contrast, can be entirely arbitrary. In an election, for example, voters are not required to have reasons for their decision -indeed, the secrecy of the ballot implies the exact opposite: it is generally unlawful even to ask a voter why he or she voted may be unclear what significance is to be attributed to them.
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In the absence of political or what we might loosely term "democratic" accountability, is it desirable to provide for legal accountability mechanisms? Two concerns immediately present themselves. First, it is unclear that the objective implementation of standards implied by legal accountability can adequately substitute for a democratic deficit: such an approach presumes that holding power to specified standards is a sufficient form of accountability, while ignoring that the standards themselves are contestable -it loses the essentially arbitrary character of democratic accountability. 22 Secondly, the relationship between those making decisions and those affected by them is different in the global administrative sphere than it is in national institutions. In a democracy, power is delegated through elections by the same population that is typically affected by decisions; in global administration there is no corresponding link between those affected and those delegating power. As a result, those with the most leverage to demand and enforce accountability may be those with least interest in doing so. accountability, which applies to all the preceding categories but also embraces "soft power"
connected with the prestige and esteem of a given state.
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Such broader conceptions of accountability may provide tools for shaping and improving global administrative decisions, even if they are unlikely to offer the revolution that may be called for in response to specific problems.
IV. Reviewing the UN Security Council
A prominent example of the demand for administrative law-type reforms in recent years can be seen at the United Nations. The content of these norms is disputed, but generally accepted norms of jus cogens include the prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and torture. intended to give effect to those resolutions. 28 As the European regulation in question violated fundamental rights (effective judicial protection and respect for property) it was struck down. 29 Nevertheless, as annulment with immediate effect "would be capable of seriously and irreversibly prejudicing the effectiveness" of the measures imposed by the Council, the effects of the regulation would be maintained for three months -that is, until 3 December
2008
. 30 This somewhat understated the potential consequences of contradictory obligations owed by member states to the European Union and the United Nations, which the ECJ's Advocate General had earlier noted might "inconvenience the Community and its Member
States in their dealings on the international stage".
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The Court's decision can be seen as an attempt to offer some leverage over the informed of their designation on a list and outlining criteria to be considered in a request to be removed. 35 None of these moves addressed the foundational concern that individuals were having their assets frozen without any formal process for review of how that decision was made, or the circumstances in which it could be revoked.
Following the ECJ decision, there is now pressure on the Council to adopt such a process. 36 The alternative is that sanctions will become ineffective and not be applied rigorously; indeed, the fact that some states are hesitant to submit new names to be included on sanctions lists and others are not seeking formal humanitarian exemptions may be evidence that this is happening already. 
V. Conclusion
Global administrative law is appropriately described as an "emerging" phenomenon. 40 The global decision-making processes that are subject to administrative law type remedies are limited and it is unlikely that such remedies will be extended to cover every such decision.
Nor should they. As indicated earlier, the formalization of certain decision-making processes is supplementary to other efforts to address global governance deficits. The argument here is that such procedures will improve the quality of decision-making and responsiveness to those affected by decisions. But not all of these problems are technical questions to be resolved by lawyers. Objective implementation of standards is not neutral 38 unless the standards themselves are legitimate. For this reason, purely legal forms of accountability will never be sufficient to address underlying political and institutional deficits.
A second criticism of global administrative law is that formalization of existing processes may entrench the interests of powerful. It probably will. Nevertheless, law's capacity to restrain power and prevent the co-optation of norms to serve the ends of the powerful has always been questionable. Writing on the development of the rule of law in eighteenth century England, the historian E.P. Thompson endorsed the Marxist view that law systematized and reified inequality between the classes. Even so, he argued, law also mediated those class relations through legal forms, constraining the actions of the ruling class. For this reason, unusually for a Marxist, he termed the rule of law an "unqualified human good." 41 Global administrative law will not bring about a New International Economic Order, but it might enable those most affected by globalization to hold those with influence to their rhetoric.
The goals of a global administrative law go beyond constraining decision-makers, however. In addition to providing "input legitimacy" to decision-making processes, broadening participation, shining light on deliberations, and providing the possibility of revisiting bad or unfair choices should improve the decisions themselves. This may be thought of as "output legitimacy".
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What, then, does this mean for the issues considered in this Project?
In the area of energy, global administrative law is unlikely to answer the high political questions of who pollutes and who pays. In the area of public health, such an approach will not resolve the problems of resources or how intellectual property rights held by the rich should be balanced against the medical needs of the poor. Yet it can offer concrete improvements to the work of the World Health Organization (WHO) as well as insights into effective reporting systems for epidemics and the rational allocation of scarce resources. 44 And in the area of finance, global administrative law will not address the basic structure of global capitalism or conjure regulatory tools to prevent speculative bubbles.
Nevertheless it may improve the accountability of institutions such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, as well as the procedures of credit-rating agencies and other actors that can affect national economies. 
